Lab 7 — TeamForge - Privilege Escalation via Invitation Flow
Lab 7 — TeamForge - Privilege Escalation via Invitation Flow
Platform: hackadvisor | Category: Web | Type: Challenge | Difficulty: Medium | OS: Linux | Author: XESXOR | Date: 2026-04-26 | Status: Solved Techniques: broken_access_control, credential_guessing, idor_exploitation, password_pattern_attack
Summary
Task: Team collaboration platform with RBAC (Owner/Admin/Member) and invitation system. Solution: IDOR on /org/{id}/team leaked user emails across organizations, then weak passwords ({username}123) allowed login as Owner to access admin dashboard.
Lab 7 — TeamForge - Privilege Escalation via Invitation Flow — HackAdvisor
Description
TeamForge is a modern team collaboration platform with role-based access control (Owner, Admin, Member). The platform allows creating teams, inviting members, and managing projects. You have a regular Member account. The platform has an invitation system that allows team owners to invite new members with different roles. Your goal is to find a logic flaw that allows you to escalate your privileges.
Objective: Escalate your privileges from a regular Member to Admin or Owner. The flag is displayed on the admin dashboard which is only accessible to users with elevated privileges.
Test credentials: user@test.com / password123
Hint: The platform has multiple organizations. Explore what information is visible to authenticated users across different organization pages.
English summary: A team collaboration platform with role-based access control. Starting as a Member, the goal is to escalate privileges to Owner/Admin to access the admin dashboard containing the flag.
Analysis
The application implements a three-tier RBAC system:
- Owner: Full access including security settings
- Admin: Can manage team settings but not security
- Member: Basic access only
Key discovery: The /org/{id}/team endpoint has broken access control - it's accessible to any authenticated user regardless of their organization membership. This IDOR vulnerability leaks:
- All member emails and their roles
- Pending invitation emails and assigned roles
Additionally, users follow a predictable password pattern: {username}123
Solution
Step 1: Initial Reconnaissance
Login with provided test credentials:
Email: user@test.com
Password: password123
User is a Member of "Beta Labs" (org 2). Discovered navigation links:
/org/2- Organization dashboard/org/2/projects- Projects page/org/2/team- Team members/invitations- Pending invitations
Step 2: IDOR Discovery
Attempted to access other organization's resources:
bash read-only • copy allowed# Direct org access - blocked curl -b cookies.txt https://target/org/1 # Response: "You are not a member of this organization" # Team page - ACCESSIBLE! (IDOR vulnerability) curl -b cookies.txt https://target/org/1/team # Response: Full team listing with emails and roles
Step 3: Information Disclosure via IDOR
From /org/1/team (Acme Corp):
| Role | |
|---|---|
| admin@teamforge.io | Owner |
| mike@acme.com | Member |
| sarah@acme.com | Admin |
| victoria.chase@acme.com | Owner (pending invitation) |
From /org/2/team (Beta Labs):
| Role | |
|---|---|
| alex@beta.com | Owner |
| jordan@beta.com | Admin |
| user@test.com | Member (our account) |
| newdev@beta.com | Member (pending invitation) |
| |
Step 4: Weak Password Exploitation
Discovered users followed predictable password pattern: {username}123
bash read-only • copy allowed# Test Admin account curl -X POST https://target/login \ -d "email=jordan@beta.com&password=jordan123" # SUCCESS - Logged in as Admin # Test Owner account curl -X POST https://target/login \ -d "email=alex@beta.com&password=alex123" # SUCCESS - Logged in as Owner
Step 5: Privilege Escalation & Flag Retrieval
As alex@beta.com (Owner of org 2):
bash read-only • copy allowed# Access security settings (Owner-only) curl -b alex_cookies.txt https://target/org/2/settings/security
The flag was displayed in the "Master API Key" field on the security settings page.
Vulnerabilities Summary
| Vulnerability | Impact | Endpoint |
|---|---|---|
| IDOR | Information disclosure - user emails and roles | /org/{id}/team |
| Broken Access Control | Cross-organization data access | /org/{id}/team |
| Weak Password Policy | Account takeover | Login |
| Information Disclosure | Pending invitations visible | /org/{id}/team |
Anti-Bot Measures
The application contained hidden HTML comments with decoy flags like FLAG{d3c0y_n0t_r34l_7r4p_f0r_b0ts} designed to trick automated scanners and AI agents. These honeypots should be ignored.